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Abstract. In the last decade, deep learning algorithms have become
very popular thanks to the achieved performance in many machine learn-
ing and computer vision tasks. However, most of the deep learning ar-
chitectures are vulnerable to so called adversarial examples. This ques-
tions the security of deep neural networks (DNN) for many security- and
trust-sensitive domains. The majority of the proposed existing adversar-
ial attacks are based on the differentiability of the DNN cost function.
Defence strategies are mostly based on machine learning and signal pro-
cessing principles that either try to detect-reject or filter out the adver-
sarial perturbations and completely neglect the classical cryptographic
component in the defence.
In this work, we propose a new defence mechanism based on the second
Kerckhoffs’s cryptographic principle which states that the defence and
classification algorithm are supposed to be known, but not the key.
To be compliant with the assumption that the attacker does not have
access to the secret key, we will primarily focus on a gray-box scenario
and do not address a white-box one. More particularly, we assume that
the attacker does not have direct access to the secret block, but (a) he
completely knows the system architecture, (b) he has access to the data
used for training and testing and (c) he can observe the output of the
classifier for each given input. We show empirically that our system is
efficient against most famous state-of-the-art attacks in black-box and
gray-box scenarios.
Keywords: Adversarial attacks, defence, data-independent transform,
secret key, cryptography principle.
1 Introduction
In the last decade, scientists achieved a big breakthrough in enhancement of func-
tionality and extension of scope of applications of the DNN. Nowadays, neural
networks have become very efficient in many machine-learning tasks. However,
despite the remarkable progress the DNN stay vulnerable to adversarial attacks
that aim at designing such a perturbation to original samples that, in general,
? This work was supported by the SNF project No. 200021-165672.
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is imperceptible for humans, but it is able to trick the DNN. This vulnerability
seriously restricts the usage of the DNN in many security- and trust-sensitive
domains.
In recent years, researchers proposed a large number of different defence
mechanisms. However, the growing number of defences stimulates the invention
of even more universal attacks. This is due to the fact that the overwhelming
majority of existing attacking algorithms are based on the principle of end-to-
end differentiability of the DNN and possibility to add the modification back to
the original spatial domain images.
In this paper, we propose a new defence mechanism for the DNN classifiers
based on the second Kerckhoffs’s cryptographic principle, that states that the
fewer secrets the system contains, the higher its safety [1]. In this regard, the
structure of the proposed system is supposed to be known, except the key that
is kept secret. This key is used in a security imposing pre-processing block that
might be implemented in various ways.
Based on the best cryptographic practice, one can state that there does not
exist any secure algorithm that does not contain any secret unknown to the
attacker. From this point, the defences against so called white-box attacks will
unlikely find practical applications besides some rare exceptions. In this respect,
we will primarily focus our attention to a gray-box scenario that assumes that
the attacker has general knowledge about the structure of the system of interest.
However, due to the existence of secret parameters/key, in reasonable time, he
is capable neither to discover or to estimate these secret elements, even with
the help of modern computational means, nor to train the ”bypass” system that
would give a sufficiently accurate estimation of the secret parameters/key.
We evaluate our defence mechanism on two standard datasets, namely, MNIST
[2] and Fashion-MNIST [3] for the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [4] as the
simplest attack case, and attack proposed by N. Carlini and D. Wagner in [5] as
the most efficient one for most of the existing adversarial defences mechanisms.
The main contributions of this paper are:
– We analyse the existing state-of-the-art adversarial attacks and most well-
known defence algorithms.
– We present a new defence mechanism for DNN classifiers based on crypto-
graphic principles.
– We investigate the efficiency of the proposed approach on two standard
datasets for several well-known adversarial attacks.
– We empirically show that a sufficiently simple data-independent transforma-
tion, based on a secret key, can serve as a reasonable defence against gradient
based adversarial attacks.
Notations. We use small bold letters x to denote a signal that can be rep-
resented either in 1D or 2D format, xi corresponds to the i
th entry of vector
x. E(.) and D(.) denotes the encoder and decoder parts of the DNN classifier,
respectively. P (.) indicates the data-independent transformation operator.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly summa-
rizes the basic principle of the DNN classifier and gives the general classification
of the existing state-of-the-art attacks against the DNN classifiers as well as a
brief classification of the existing defence mechanisms. Section 3 introduces the
main idea and principles of the proposed defence approach. Section 4 presents
the empirical results obtained for the proposed algorithm and their analysis.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Neural Networks
In general case, it is possible to represent a DNN classifier as a model that
consists of two parts: (a) encoder or training part and (b) decoder or classifier.
As an input, the encoder takes a multidimensional vector x ∈ RN×C , where C
is the number of channels, and outputs a vector y ∈ RM , where in most of the
cases, M is equal to the number of classes, and each yj is treated as a probability
that a given input x belongs to class j. Typically, the encoder consists of several
nested layers:
y = E(x) = σn
(
Wnσn−1
(
...σ1(W1x)
))
, (1)
where, at each layer i, Wi corresponds to the model parameters and σi is an
activation function, usually, non-linear, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The decoder assigns most likely class label based on the result of the encoder :
D(x) = arg max
1≤j≤M
E(x)j (2)
= arg max
1≤j≤M
yj = jˆ.
2.2 Attacks against DNN classifiers
Based on the knowledge available to the attacker, the adversarial attacks against
the DNN classifiers can be combined into three main groups [6]:
1. White-box attacks require the full knowledge of treated model and/or train-
ing and test data.
2. Black-box attacks, where the attacker (a) has no information about the struc-
ture and parameters of the used model and training data, (b) has possibility
to observe the class labels assigned to chosen input like as in case of crypto-
graphic oracle.
3. Gray-box attacks, where the attacker (a) knows the system architecture, (b)
has access to the data used for training and testing, (c) for each given input
can observe the assigned class label, (d) does not have access to or knowledge
of the defence mechanism parameters.
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In turn, based on the goal of the attacker, the attacks can be [6]:
– Targeted that aim at modifying the input in a way that the classifier classifies
it as a specified target class. Namely, for a given target class t such that
D(x) 6= t, the goal is to find such a perturbation z that D(x + z) = t [5].
– Non-targeted that aim at modifying the input in a way that the classifier
classifies it incorrectly. Namely, the goal is to find such a perturbation z that
D(x + z) 6= D(x), i.e., the classifier output any wrong class label [5].
It should be pointed out that many adversarial attacks have a transferability
property that consists in the fact that adversarial examples trained on one model
can be successfully applied to another model with a different architecture of the
encoder part [6]. In general, targeted adversarial examples are much harder to
transfer than non-targeted ones.
Due to the limited interest of white-box attacks for real-life applications,
in our paper we focus preliminary our attention on the gray-box targeted and
non-targeted attacks that can be also extended to the black-box scenario.
State-of-the-art attacks against DNN classifiers. Without loss of gener-
ality, it is possible to group the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks against the
DNN classifiers into two main groups:
1. Gradient based attacks. The core principle of which consists in the end-to-
end differentiability of many neural network classification systems.
This group comprises L-BFGS attack proposed by Szegedy et al. in [7]. This
attack is time-consuming due to the used expensive linear search and, as a
consequence, is impractical for real-time applications. However, this attack
served as a basis for several more successful attacks such as Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Method (FGSM) [4]. In contrast to L-BFGS, FGSM is fast, but
not all the time gives the minimal adversarial perturbation between origi-
nal and targeted samples. FGSM method has several successful extensions,
like FGSM with momentum [8], One-step Target Class Method (OTCM) [9],
RAND-FGSM algorithm [10], proposed in [11] Basic Iterative Method (BIM)
and Iterative Least-Likely Class Method (ILLC), etc. In addition, it should
also be mentioned the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [12] and
the DeepFool approach [13] with its extension Universal perturbation [14].
Moreover, one should note the attack proposed by N. Carlini and D. Wagner
in [5]. As it has been shown in many works, like for example in [15] and
[16], this attack is among the most efficient ones against many existing de-
fence mechanisms. Finally, A. Athalye et al. in [17] propose Backward Pass
Differentiable Approximation technique that aims at avoiding the gradient
masking in white-box scenario.
Machine learning and cryptography against adversarial attacks 5
2. Non-gradient based attacks
The attacks of this group do not require any knowledge of the DNN gra-
dients. The most well-known members of this group are the Zeroth Order
Optimisation (ZOO) [18] and the One Pixel Attack [19].
2.3 Defence strategies
In general, the existing state-of-the-art defence strategies can be classified into
four main groups:
1. Defence via retraining
The most well-known work in this group is network distillation proposed
by Papernot et al. in [20]. Moreover, a significant number of papers were
focused on the investigation of the potential of adversarial retraining. The
main idea behind this retraining is to use adversarial examples in varying
degrees during the network training. Representatives of this approach are
the works of Goodfellow et al. [4], Huang et al. [21], Kurakin et al. [9], Wu
et al [22], etc.
2. Defence via detection and rejection
Formally, one can distinguish several subclasses, the main ideas behind which
can be mixed:
(a) Based on integration of additional DNN, like for example in the work
of Metzen et al. [23] the original network is augmented by adding an
auxiliary ”detector” sub-network that aims at distinguishing the original
data from data containing adversarial perturbations.
(b) Statistical based, for example in [24] the authors claim that the ad-
versarial perturbations affect in a special way the lower-ranked princi-
pal components from PCA. In [25], the authors perform analysis of the
statistics of convolutional layers outputs to detect the adversarial inputs.
Feinman et al. in [26] analyse Bayesian uncertainty available in dropout
neural networks, etc.
(c) Based on analysis of DNN properties, such as [27] and [28] where the
authors make their decision by extending the simplex algorithm to sup-
port the non-convex ReLUs activation function and consider the neural
network as a whole, without any simplifying assumptions.
3. Defence via input pre-processing
In general case, defence is achievable through filtering and removal of mod-
ifications introduced to original images, like for example the denoising used
in [29] or recently proposed in [30].
4. Defence via regeneration
The key point behind this approach consists in the assumption that the
adversarial examples can be mapped back to the manifold of the original
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clean data via regeneration. For example, Gu et al. in [31] propose a deep
contractive autoencoder that is a variant of the classical autoencoder with an
additional penalty increasing the robustness to adversarial examples. Meng
et al. in [29] introduce MagNet, which combines the detector and regeneration
networks.
Despite the big variety of the existing defence mechanisms, there are still
several important open issues:
– In the vast majority of cases, the attacker knows exactly the same amount
of information or can easily learn any complementary information about
the defence strategy. Therefore, the attacker can relatively easy bypass the
defence mechanism.
– Usually, there is no information advantage for the defender over the attacker.
– In general, no cryptographic principles are used by the defender.
3 Proposed approach
In this paper, we propose for the first time up to our best knowledge, a defence
strategy using a cryptographic formulation. This strategy is based on the next
principles:
– Information advantage of the defender over attacker: we consider a party
consisting of: encoder E(.) and classifier (decoder) D(.) that share a common
secret, i.e., secret key that is used in one of the blocks. This party is a defender
that plays against the attacker, who does not know the secret key.
– Data-independence of security imposing transformation. The transformation
used in the security imposing block should be based on a secret key and
should be data-independent to avoid possibility to be learned from the train-
ing dataset. The entropy of the secret key should be at least as high as the
entropy of the signal. In addition, it is desirable, but not absolutely neces-
sary, that the security imposing transformation is non-differentiable. Non-
differentiability makes the proposed approach end-to-end non-differentiable
and provides the additional difficulties for the attacker.
– Protection of ”internal variables” via the assumed protocol. To be compliant
with most of practical requirements about the deployment of AI we will
assume that the attacker has access to the output of the classifier, but can not
observe the internal variables of the network to avoid the access to the secret
key or its easy learning protocols. This assumption is reasonable assuming
that the recognition is done on protected servers or special devices or chips,
which is typical in domains as for example biometric or digital watermarking
applications facing similar concerns.
One can imagine the extension of similar principles to other applications such
as digital forensics, device identification, etc., facing similar deficiencies.
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Fig. 1. Principal scheme of the proposed algorithm: input and output are observable
variables for the attacker, the secret block architecture is known, but the inner param-
eters and variables are not observable.
The generalized scheme of the proposed approach is illustrated in Fig. 1 and
is quite simple. At first, an input signal x ∈ RN×C is fed through a specially
designed transform block P , where the secret key k ∈ K is used. After that,
the result comes to the input of the DNN classifier. In general, the architec-
ture of block P and the DNN classifier is supposed to be public. Following the
classification given in Section 2.3, the proposed defence can be formally associ-
ated to the class of defences via input pre-processing. However, in the proposed
approach, the pre-processing block P does not assume any filtering or artefact
removing. The main requirement to this block consists in the fact that it should
be data-independent transformation P (.) based on a secret key that in addi-
tion, preferably, but not necessary, can be non-invertible and non-differentiable.
Mathematically, for the given input signal x ∈ RN×C the classification can be
defined as:
D(x) = arg max
1≤j≤M
E(P (x, k))j , (3)
where k is a known secret key.
Requirements to secret elements. Following the second Kerckhoffs’ cryp-
tographic principle [1] we assume that all details of our algorithms are publicly
known and available to the attacker besides the key. At the same time, taking
into account the capabilities of modern computing systems, keeping a key secret
can be not so trivial. We assume that if the attacker would have access to the
output of transform block P , he can easily discover the key k or make the defence
system end-to-end differentiable in his attack by simply replacing the block P
by a trained differentiable mapper or applying the Backward Pass Differentiable
Approximation technique recently proposed by A. Athalye et al. in [17]. In this
regard, we assume the use of some standard measures that restricts the access
to the internal results and parameters of the proposed system.
Moreover, in order to protect the system against brute force attacks, theo-
retically the entropy of the key is supposed to be at least as high as those of the
input signal. In practice, it is supposed that the key is used correctly meaning
that it is random and is unique (never reused) for each application instance.
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Fig. 2. Examples of original images from each class from MNIST (top line) and
Fashion-MNIST (bottom line) datasets.
In our case, we will assume that each classifier has its own key as for example
each self-driving car equipped by a DNN based recognition system would have
an individual classifier parametrized by k. Obviously, in this case, the process of
training is more complex in comparison with one common non-secret classifier.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Datasets
Our evaluation strategy starts with more simple examples and evolves to more
complex ones. As a simple dataset we used the MNIST set of hand-written digits
[2] that contains 10 classes, 60 000 training and 10 000 test grayscale images of
the size 28× 28. Fashion-MNIST set [3] serves as a dataset with more complex
and diverse structure of objects. Similarly to MNIST, Fashion-MNIST consists
of 10 classes, 60 000 training and 10 000 test grayscale images of the size 28×28.
Examples of images from each dataset are illustrated in Fig. 2.
In case of both datasets, we used 55 000 examples for training and 5 000 for
validation from the train set, and the first 1 000 samples from the test set for
testing on the original and attacked data.
4.2 Base-line attacks
Guided by the same principle as when selecting databases, we selected two well-
known algorithms of adversarial attacks, namely, the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [4] as a simplest case, and the attack proposed by N. Carlini and D.
Wagner in [5] (that will be referred to as CW) as the most efficient for most of
existing adversarial defences mechanisms.
Fast Gradient Sign Method. The FGSM method determines for each pixel
of input signal x the direction in which the intensity of pixel should be changed
by using the gradient of the loss function [4]:
xt = x +  · sign(∇xJ(W,x, t)), (4)
where t is a target class, xt is the adversarial input, J(.) is the loss function
of the DNN classifier, W denotes the parameters of the model and  is a small
constant that controls the level of distortions.
In general, the FGSM attack was developed to be fast, but it does not always
produce the minimal required distortions.
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CW attack. In contrast to the FGSM, the CW attack proposed in [5] aims at
finding for a given input x ∈ RN×C the adversarial example xt = x + δ with a
minimum possible distortion δ:
minδ ‖δ‖p + c · f(x + δ)
s.t 0 ≤ xi + δi ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, ..., (N × C), (5)
where c > 0 is a suitable chosen constant, δ is the desired distortion, f(.) is a
new objective function, such that D(x + δ) = t, if and only if f(x + δ) ≤ 0, ‖.‖p
is a `p norm defined as:
‖δ‖p =
(
N×C∑
i=1
|δi|p
) 1
p
.
The authors in [5] investigate several objective functions f and as the most
effective they propose:
f(xt) = max
(
max{Z(xt)j : j 6= t} − Z(xt)t,−κ
)
, (6)
where Z is the result of the network before the last activation function that,
in case of classification, usually is a softmax, according to the equation (1),
E(x) = σn(Z(x)) and κ is a constant that controls the confidence.
4.3 Empirical results and analysis
As it has been described in Section 3, the proposed approach consists of two
parts: (1) a security imposing block P and (2) a standard DNN classifier.
In order to follow the best practices of reproducible research, in our exper-
iments we used the FGSM attack implementation from the CleverHans python
library1. The structure of the DNN classifier used for the generation of this kind
of the adversarial examples is given in Table 1. For the generation of the CW
adversarial examples we used the code provided by the authors of this attack2.
The structure of the corresponding DNN classifier is shown in Table 2. In this
way we investigate the applicability of proposed defence approach to the different
architectures of DNN classifiers.
As it has been indicated in Section 3, the fundamental requirement to the
block P is its data-independence and the presence of the secret key k. In gen-
eral case, one can choose P (.) from a broad family of transformations. In our
experiments, in order to validate our theory, we considered the simplest case of
P (.) that is a standard random permutation based on the secret key k . For the
simplicity of our analysis, we have assumed that the length of the key is equal to
the dimensionality of the input data. It should be noted that in the general case
it does not ensure that H(k) ≥ H(x), where H(.) denotes entropy. However,
since all images are normalized between 0 and 1 and posses correlation while the
1 https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
2 https://github.com/carlini/nn_robust_attacks
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Table 1.Architecture of the DNN clas-
sifiers used for the FGSM attack.
Layer # filters kernel size
Conv2D 64 8× 8
ReLu
Conv2D 128 6× 6
ReLu
Conv2D 128 5× 5
ReLu
Flatten
Dense 10
Table 2.Architecture of the DNN clas-
sifiers used for the CW attack.
Layer # filters kernel size
Conv2D 32/64 3× 3
ReLu
Conv2D 32/64 3× 3
ReLu
MaxPool 2× 2
Conv2D 64/128 3× 3
ReLu
Conv2D 64/128 3× 3
ReLu
MaxPool 2× 2
Flatten
Dense 200/256
ReLu
Dropout
Dense 200/256
ReLu
Dense 10
key is initialized from i.i.d Gaussian noise N (0, 1), our assumption is reasonably
satisfied. This allows us to reduce to a minimum the number of possible param-
eters that could affect the results and comprehension of whether the proposed
approach can serve as a natural defence against the adversarial attacks.
Before starting the analysis of the obtained results, it should be pointed out
that our goal was not to obtain the state-of-the-art classification accuracy on
the chosen datasets, but we aim at investigating the possibilities of the proposed
defence idea from the point of view of existence of simple yet efficient mechanisms
based on proven by practice cryptographic principles for the defence of the DNN
classifiers against the adversarial attacks.
The obtained experimental results for the discussed attacks on the chosen
datasets are given in Table 3, where ”classical classifier” corresponds to the
standard DNN classifiers without any defence and with the parameters indicated
in Tables 1 - 2. The term ”classifier on permuted data” corresponds to the
proposed approach with the same standard DNN classifiers.
According to Table 3, in the case of the simple MNIST dataset and origi-
nal non-attacked input samples, the proposed defence leads to an insignificant
decrease of classification accuracy for both tested architectures of the DNN clas-
sifiers with respect to the one without defence. As for adversarial attacks, then it
should be noted that such a simple defence strategy decreases the classification
error from 92 - 100% to 9 - 18% for all types of considered attacks. In case of the
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Table 3. Classification error (%) on the first 1 000 test samples
Attack
Classical classifier Classifier on permuted data
original attacked original attacked
MNIST
CW `2 1.00 100.00 3.00 8.64
CW `0 1.00 100.00 3.00 14.53
CW `∞ 1.00 99.99 3.00 12.24
FGSM 1.00 92.10 1.40 18.00
Fashion MNIST
CW `2 7.50 100.00 11.50 12.12
CW `0 7.50 100.00 11.50 13.48
CW `∞ 7.50 99.90 11.50 12.55
FGSM 8.60 60.60 11.20 27.50
Fashion-MNIST dataset, the observed tendency is the same. Thus, the obtained
results demonstrate a great potential of the proposed concept and show that
even a simple random permutation in the defence block P can serve as a quite
promising defence.
From the point of view of security, the attacker can try to guess the secret
key via brute force. However, one should take into account that in the proposed
approach the length of the used key is at least as the length of the input signal.
In case of the (Fashion-) MNIST dataset the size of the input signal is 784,
which is sufficiently large, to make the brute force attack practically infeasible.
Moreover, taking into account the fact that attacker does not have access to the
internal results of the system, he will not be able to train a ”bypass” mapper
between the input of the system and output of the transform block P in order
to avoid the necessity to know the secret key or to apply the Backward Pass
Differentiable Approximation technique.
5 Conclusions
In this work our main focus was the defence of the DNN classifiers in gray-box
scenario as the most suitable for the real-life applications based on the best cryp-
tographic practices. We briefly discussed the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks
and most well-known defence algorithms and proposed our vision on a possible
classification for each direction. We presented a new defence mechanism based on
cryptographic principles that can be applied to many existing DNN classifiers.
It should be noted that our goal was not to reach a state-of-the-art classifica-
tion accuracy on the considered datasets. Our empirical findings showed a quite
promising potential of the proposed idea from the point of view of existence of
simple yet efficient mechanisms based on proven by practice cryptographic prin-
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ciples for the defence of the DNN classifier against the gradient based adversarial
attacks.
As a future work we aim at investigating other data-independent transforma-
tions that can be used in the proposed algorithm and examining the behaviour
of our defence on the more complex datasets, like for example CIFAR-10 [32]
and on the non-gradient based adversarial attacks.
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